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THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
AND EXPERT TESTIMONY: 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 
SUPREME COURT AND THE NEW YORK 
STATE COURT OF APPEALS 
Andrew C. Fine 
INTRODUCTION 
Crawford v. Washington1 promised an entirely new approach 
to the Confrontation Clause.2 Under the regime of Ohio v. 
Roberts,3 the scope of the Clause was essentially coterminous 
with the rule against hearsay. A nontestifying declarant’s out-of-
court statements, including her written reports, were generally 
admissible in New York because of the state’s expansive view of 
the exceptions to the hearsay rule. Crawford, however, 
overruled Roberts and seemed to signal transformative change, 
because it explicitly severed the link between the Clause and the 
scope of the prohibition against hearsay. The decisive inquiry 
became whether an out-of-court hearsay statement is testimonial 
in character, rather than whether it is reliable. If a statement is 
testimonial, and is offered for its truth, its introduction is 
prohibited in the absence of an opportunity to cross-examine the 
declarant, regardless of its evidentiary admissibility. 
In deciding to abandon the Roberts approach, Justice Scalia’s 
opinion in Crawford condemned the Roberts Court’s willingness 
to “leave the Sixth Amendment’s protection to the vagaries of 
                                                          
 Director, New York Court of Appeals Litigation, The Legal Aid Society, 
Criminal Appeals Bureau. 
1 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
2 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
3 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
458 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
the rules of evidence,”4 and to “allow[] a jury to hear evidence, 
untested by the adversary process, based on a mere judicial 
determination of reliability.”5 “Dispensing with confrontation 
because testimony is obviously reliable,” the opinion declares, 
“is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is 
obviously guilty.”6 Accordingly, a hearsay statement’s 
reliability, as measured by whether a judge concludes that it fits 
under a hearsay exception or believes that it is otherwise 
“trustworthy,” has become irrelevant under the Confrontation 
Clause. If the declarant does not testify and the statement is 
testimonial within the meaning of the Clause, its admission 
violates the Clause, regardless of its reliability. Out-of-court 
statements from a nontestifying declarant that are not offered for 
their truth, however, do not run afoul of the Clause.7  
In Crawford’s aftermath, important questions have arisen 
regarding its applicability to an expert’s “basis” testimony that 
either incorporates or relies upon out-of-court statements by 
nontestifying declarants. In addition, courts have addressed the 
constitutional admissibility of lab reports based on tests 
conducted by nontestifying analysts, and whether the 
Confrontation Clause problem can be finessed by offering the 
reports through the testimony of experts who were not involved 
in the testing process. This piece will address the manner in 
which the New York State court of appeals has grappled with 
Crawford and its progeny in the area of expert testimony and lab 
reports. 
Since Crawford, New York’s high court has, unlike most 
appellate courts, recognized the hearsay character of an expert’s 
“basis” testimony that incorporates the statements of 
nontestifying declarants. If those statements are testimonial in 
character, their introduction through the expert violates the 
Confrontation Clause. However, the court of appeals has simply 
refused to recognize that the Supreme Court’s post-Crawford 
                                                          
4 541 U.S. at 61. 
5 Id. at 62. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. at 59. 
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decision in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,8 subsequently 
reinforced by Bullcoming v. New Mexico,9 squarely held that the 
introduction of laboratory reports prepared by nontestifying 
declarants, and any expert testimony based on them, is 
prohibited by the Clause. Supreme Court precedent contradicts 
the court of appeals’ rulings upholding the admission of such 
evidence. 
I. EXPERT “BASIS” TESTIMONY RELYING ON STATEMENTS MADE 
BY NONTESTIFYING DECLARANTS: PEOPLE V. GOLDSTEIN10 
Prior to Crawford, most courts viewed an expert witness’ 
“basis” testimony as nonhearsay. In such jurisdictions, the 
documents, lab reports, or other information upon which the 
expert relied were ostensibly not being offered for their truth, 
but rather only to assist the jury in evaluating the validity of the 
expert’s opinion.11 The federal courts that have followed this 
approach have relied on Federal Rule of Evidence 703, which 
allows an expert to base an opinion on “facts or data in the case 
that the expert has been made aware of or personally observed,” 
and further declares that such facts “need not be admissible for 
the opinion to be admitted.” Moreover, even if such facts 
“would otherwise be inadmissible, the proponent of the opinion 
may disclose them to the jury,” if their probative value 
“substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.”  
Since the federal approach is premised on the view that 
“basis” testimony is not hearsay, such testimony seemed to be 
immune from Crawford scrutiny when offered in cases tried in 
federal courts, and in states with similar evidentiary rules. 
Indeed, that is how most federal courts have treated this subject 
since Crawford,12 and a number of state courts have relied on 
                                                          
8 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009). 
9 Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011). 
10 People v. Goldstein, 843 N.E.2d 727 (N.Y. 2005). 
11 E.g., United States v. Farley, 992 F.2d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir. 1993); 
Boone v. Moore, 980 F.2d 539, 542 (8th Cir. 1992); People v. Nieves, 739 
N.E.2d 1277, 1284 (Ill. 2000). 
12 See, e.g., United States v. Augustin, 661 F.3d 1105, 1128–29 (11th 
Cir. 2011); United States v. Pablo, 625 F.3d 1285, 1292 (10th Cir. 2010). 
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similar provisions in their evidence codes to reach the same 
result. 
However, New York has no evidence code or written rules, 
and the New York court of appeals—unlike most jurisdictions—
has long considered an expert witness’ “basis” testimony to be a 
form of hearsay that could run afoul of the Confrontation 
Clause. In People v. Sugden, the court recognized that the 
Clause is potentially implicated when a prosecution expert 
“base[s] his opinion on material not in evidence,”13 and in 
People v. Stone,14 the court acknowledged the “legally hearsay” 
character of expert testimony reliant upon out-of-court 
statements.15 But, anticipating the rationale that the Supreme 
Court would thereafter adopt in Ohio v. Roberts, the court, in 
essence, created a reliability-based hearsay exception. The court 
stated that a prosecution expert “may rely on material, albeit of 
out-of-court origin, if it is of a kind accepted in the profession 
as reliable in forming a professional opinion.”16 Post-Crawford, 
the Sugden/Stone approach retains validity as an evidentiary 
matter, but the hearsay exception set forth in those decisions can 
no longer justify the introduction of such expert testimony by the 
prosecution without calling the declarant, if the statements on 
which it is based are testimonial in character. 
The New York court of appeals recognized this in People v. 
Goldstein. In that case, which involved an insanity defense, a 
private psychiatrist hired by the prosecution relied on her out-of-
court interviews with nontestifying witnesses regarding the 
defendant’s alleged prior conduct to support her opinion that 
Goldstein was not insane, and recited the contents of those 
interviews before the jury.  
The court of appeals rejected defendant’s evidentiary 
challenge to the professional reliability of the interviews under 
                                                          
But cf. United States v. Mejia, 545 F.3d 179, 197–99 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding 
it improper to permit expert police officer to communicate out-of-court 
testimonial statements of nontestifying confidential informants and 
cooperating witnesses directly to the jury as the basis for his expert opinion). 
13 People v. Sugden, 323 N.E.2d 169, 172 (N.Y. 1974). 
14 People v. Stone, 315 N.E.2d 787, 791 (N.Y. 1974). 
15 Id. 
16 Sugden, 323 N.E.2d at 173. 
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Sugden and Stone.17 However, it ruled that the contents of the 
interviews constituted testimonial hearsay and hence were 
inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause as interpreted by 
Crawford. The prosecution argued that their psychiatrist’s 
recitation of the contents of her interviews with nontestifying 
declarants was not hearsay because it was admitted merely to 
assist the jury in evaluating the psychiatrist’s opinion. In 
dismissing this claim, the court declared, “[w]e do not see how 
the jury could use the statements of the [nontestifying] 
interviewees to evaluate [the prosecution psychiatrist’s] opinion 
without accepting as a premise either that the statements were 
true or that they were false. Since the prosecution’s goal was to 
buttress [the psychiatrist’s] opinion, the prosecution obviously 
wanted and expected the jury to take the statements as true.”18 
Accordingly, the statements “were offered for their truth, and 
are hearsay.”19  
The Goldstein court then ruled that the hearsay statements 
relied on by the psychiatrist were testimonial as well, and 
therefore that their introduction in the declarants’ absence violated 
the Confrontation Clause under Crawford. It reasoned that the 
interviewees had to have known that the prosecution had retained 
                                                          
17 Even though it approved the admission of the expert’s reliance on the 
civilians’ statements as an evidentiary matter, the Goldstein Court was 
troubled by the notion that an expert may “repeat to the jury all the hearsay 
information on which [her opinion] was based.” People v. Goldstein, 843 
N.E.2d 727, 731 (N.Y. 2005). It recognized that “it can be argued that there 
should be at least some limit on the right of the proponent of an expert’s 
opinion to put before the factfinder all the information, not otherwise 
admissible, on which the opinion is based. Otherwise, a party might 
effectively nullify the hearsay rule by making that party’s expert a ‘conduit 
for hearsay.’” Id. (quoting Hutchinson v. Groskin, 927 F.2d 722, 725 (2d 
Cir. 1991)). 
18 Id. at 732. 
19 Id. at 733; accord People v. Dungo, 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 702, 711–14 
(Ct. App. 2009), review granted, 220 P.3d 240 (Cal. Dec. 2, 2009); see 
People v. Archuleta, 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 727, 731 (Ct. App. 2011); People v. 
Hill, 120 Cal. Rptr. 3d 251, 270–79 (Ct. App. 2011). The Supreme Court 
may well resolve the expert basis hearsay issue for Sixth Amendment 
purposes in Williams v. Illinois, 939 N.E.2d 268 (Ill. 2010), cert. granted, 
131 S. Ct. 3090 (argued Dec. 6, 2011) (No. 10-8505). 
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the psychiatrist to testify against Goldstein. Accordingly, “all of 
them should reasonably have expected their statements ‘to be used 
prosecutorially’ or ‘to be available for use at a later trial.’”20  
The admissibility of the expert’s opinion itself was not at 
issue in Goldstein, but since the opinion was based in part on 
the inadmissible statements made to the psychiatrist, it was 
dependent on testimonial hearsay and hence suffered from the 
same constitutional defect. The expert’s opinion could not be 
fairly evaluated in the absence of an opportunity for cross-
examination of the declarants who provided the necessary 
foundation.21 Nor would the problem be solved by not revealing 
on the stand the testimonial hearsay on which the expert relied. 
Camouflaging the sources of the opinion puts the cross-examiner 
“in an untenable position: expose the inadmissible hearsay or 
forego effective cross-examination.”22  
In view of the court of appeals’ prior treatment of expert 
“basis” testimony as hearsay, the outcome in Goldstein was not 
surprising, though it represents a minority view nationally. But 
it is difficult to deny its underlying logic: if acceptance of an 
expert’s opinion is dependent on another person’s statement, the 
opinion is worthless unless the statement is true.23  
                                                          
20 Goldstein, 843 N.E.2d at 733 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 
U.S. 36, 51–52 (2004)). The court further held that the statements were 
sufficiently “formal” to qualify as testimonial, noting that Crawford itself did 
not require strict formality, and found a statement to be testimonial that “was 
unsworn and used colloquial phrasing.” Id. It also determined that although 
the psychiatrist was not a “government officer . . . . the Confrontation 
Clause would offer too little protection if it could be avoided by assigning the 
job of interviewing witnesses to an independent contractor rather than an 
employee.” Id. at 733–34. 
21 See Richard D. Friedman, Initial Thoughts on Williams, 
CONFRONTATION BLOG (July 9, 2011), http://confrontationright.blogspot. 
com/2011/07/initial-thoughts-on-williams.html; see also Julie A. Seaman, 
Triangulating Testimonial Hearsay: The Constitutional Boundaries of Expert 
Opinion Testimony, 96 GEO. L.J. 827, 879 (2008). 
22 Paul Shechtman, People v. Goldstein and Rule 703, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 
13, 2006, at 4, col. 4; accord Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Evidence and the 
Confrontation Clause After Crawford v. Washington, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 791, 
856–57 (2007); Seaman, supra note 21, at 879. 
23 See Mnookin, supra note 22. 
 The Confrontation Clause and Expert Testimony 463 
II. NEW YORK’S INITIAL POST-CRAWFORD TREATMENT OF 
SCIENTIFIC REPORTS ADMITTED IN THE ANALYST’S ABSENCE: 
PEOPLE V. RAWLINS, PEOPLE V. MEEKINS, AND PEOPLE V. 
FREYCINET 
The next cases before the court of appeals regarding the 
applicability of Crawford to expert testimony about scientific 
procedures were People v. Rawlins and People v. Meekins 
(decided jointly).24 In Rawlins, a police detective, who did not 
testify, examined latent fingerprints that had been lifted from 
two burglary sites. The detective’s report, introduced at trial in 
the detective’s absence over the defendant’s Confrontation 
Clause objection, concluded that those prints matched the 
defendant’s right thumbprint. By a vote of six to one, the court 
held in Rawlins that the fingerprint comparison report 
constituted testimonial hearsay under Crawford, and thus its 
admission at trial in the absence of the specialist’s testimony 
violated Rawlins’ Confrontation Clause rights.25 In Meekins, 
however, the court unanimously upheld the introduction of a 
DNA testing report through the testimony of experts who did 
not participate in the testing, even though the experts who 
conducted the tests were not called to the stand. The report, 
based on tests conducted by a private laboratory at the behest of 
police, did not include a comparison of that DNA with the 
defendant’s.26 The majority opinion discussed the circumstances 
under which business records prepared by or at the behest of 
law enforcement should be deemed to constitute testimonial 
hearsay under Crawford.  
Ultimately, the court concluded that the most critical issue is 
whether a law enforcement “business record” directly accuses 
                                                          
24 People v. Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d 1019 (N.Y. 2008). 
25 Id. at 1033. A second detective who also offered this report testified to 
his independent assessment of the sets of prints, concluding that they matched 
the defendant’s prints. A third detective testified to the match as well, as a 
defense witness. Relying on their testimony, the court of appeals held that the 
erroneous introduction of the report by the nontestifying detective, in 
violation of the Confrontation Clause, constituted harmless error. Id. at 
1022–24, 1033–34. 
26 Id. at 1034–36. 
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the defendant of a crime. Thus, the court stated, “[O]ur task in 
each case must be to evaluate whether a statement is properly 
viewed as a surrogate for accusatory in-court testimony.”27 Such 
reports, the court suggested, will likely be viewed as 
testimonial, but even more clearly, the court indicated that few 
others would be. Adopting a pinched view of Crawford, the 
court rejected as “too broad” a test that depends on the 
declarant’s reasonable expectation that a statement will be used 
prosecutorially.28 It determined that the result in Davis v. 
Washington,29 allowing the introduction of a nontestifying 
domestic-violence complainant’s accusations against her former 
boyfriend in a 911 call, would have been different had this 
standard been determinative, since the complainant could well 
have expected her statements to be used against Davis at trial.30  
The court also considered the proper practice for lab reports 
that memorialize results of scientific tests, relying heavily on the 
“insights” and “reasoning” underlying three pro-prosecution 
state high court decisions, State v. Crager,31 People v. Geier,32 
and Commonwealth v. Verde,33 which it found to be 
“instructive.”34 The court adopted the Massachusetts supreme 
judicial court’s reasoning in Verde that the drug-test certificates 
at issue did not “concern the exercise of fallible human 
judgment,” but “merely [recorded, contemporaneously, the 
procedures taken and] state[d] the results of a well-recognized 
scientific test determining the composition and quantity of the 
substance.”35 Such “contemporaneous recordation of scientific 
                                                          
27 Id. at 1029. 
28 Id. 
29 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
30 Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1029. 
31 State v. Crager, 116 Ohio St. 3d 369, 2007-Ohio-6840, 879 N.E.2d 
745, cert. granted, vacated mem., 129 S. Ct. 2856 (June 29, 2009) (No. 07-
10191). 
32 People v. Geier, 161 P.3d 104 (Cal. 2007). 
33 Commonwealth v. Verde, 827 N.E.2d 701 (Mass. 2005), abrogated 
by Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009). 
34 Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1030–32. 
35 Id. at 1031 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Verde, 827 N.E.2d at 705). 
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protocol,” the court reasoned, “must be undertaken independent 
of any possible use at trial, for the independent purpose of 
ensuring that the test was properly administered.”36  
Discussing the Ohio supreme court’s decision in Crager, 
which involved a DNA report, the court of appeals noted that 
the technicians “could have reasonably expected that 
the . . . reports would be used in a later prosecution,” but that 
the Ohio court determined that any concern that the reports 
could be “prejudicial is allayed . . . because such notes 
‘represented the contemporaneous recordation’ of the . . . results 
‘as [they were] actually performing those tasks’ pursuant to 
industry protocols.”37 Accordingly, “police or prosecutorial 
involvement in a case like Crager becomes a nonissue, and the 
focus shifts to declarant.”38 Adapting the “primary purpose” test 
used by Davis v. Washington39 to evaluate whether statements 
made in response to police interrogation are testimonial, the 
court of appeals concluded that a technician’s motivation and 
purpose are to “simply record[], contemporaneously, the 
administration of scientific protocol to reveal what is hidden 
from the naked eye”; the technician “ordinarily has no 
subjective interest in the test’s outcome.”40 The court also cited, 
with approval, the Ohio court’s reasoning that the lab, although 
its mission was to “aid law enforcement,” was “not itself an 
‘arm’ of law enforcement in the sense that . . . [its] purpose 
[was] to obtain incriminating results.”41 
Judge Jones’ opinion for the court approvingly noted that in 
Geier, another DNA case, the California supreme court had 
similarly relied upon the “contemporaneous recordation” 
rationale; the DNA analysis, the court of appeals reasoned, was 
based on observations similar to those of a Davis-style declarant 
                                                          
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 1030–31 (quoting State v. Crager, 116 Ohio St. 3d 369, 2007-
Ohio-6840, 879 N.E.2d 745, cert. granted, vacated mem., 129 S. Ct. 2856 
(June 29, 2009) (No. 07-10191)). 
38 Id. at 1031. 
39 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). 
40 Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1031. 
41 Id. at 1030 (quoting Crager, 879 N.E.2d at 753). 
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who is reporting an emergency.42 “[T]he . . . raw data were not 
‘accusatory’ ( . . . in a Sixth Amendment sense) and the analyst 
did not ‘bear witness’ against defendant.”43 Rather, she 
generated the report “for the purpose of adhering to 
‘standardized scientific protocol.’”44  
Though the courts emphasized the “objectivity of the scientific 
procedures at issue” in these three cases, none of the reports that 
were held admissible were “directly accusatory, in the sense that 
they explicitly linked the defendants to the crimes.”45 The court of 
appeals viewed this to be critical. It was “particularly noticeable 
in Geier” that although the laboratory analysis was conducted by 
nontestifying technicians, “the comparison to defendant’s DNA 
was made by a testifying witness.”46 Though this distinction “is 
not an infallible touchstone,” the court wrote, “[i]n close 
cases, . . . the directness with which a particular statement points 
to the defendant as the offender is a factor to be considered.”47 
However, the court also said that “statements can often be 
testimonial where their tendency to inculpate the defendant is only 
indirect.”48  
Summarizing its overall approach, the court stated that “[t]he 
question of testimoniality requires consideration of multiple 
factors, not all of equal import in every case.”49 Two of these, 
however, “play an especially important role in this determination: 
first, whether the statement was prepared in a manner resembling 
ex parte examination and second, whether the statement accuses 
the defendant of criminal wrongdoing.”50 These “interrelated 
touchstones” are informed by “the purpose of making or 
generating the statement, and the declarant’s motive for doing 
so . . . .”51  
                                                          
42 Id. at 1032. 
43 Id. (quoting People v. Geier, 161 P.3d 104, 140 (Cal. 2007)). 
44 Id. (quoting Geier, 161 P.3d at 140). 
45 Id. at 1033. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
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Applying these principles to Rawlins, the court concluded 
that the fingerprint reports at issue were testimonial because 
their maker, “a police detective, prepared his reports solely for 
prosecutorial purposes and, most importantly, because they were 
accusatory and offered to establish defendant’s identity.”52 
Comparing latent prints recovered from a crime scene with 
fingerprints from a known individual “fit the classic definition of 
‘a weaker substitute for live testimony’ at trial.”53 The technician 
was “‘testifying’ through his reports that, in his opinion, 
defendant is the same person who committed the burglaries,” 
and his only purpose was “to ultimately apprehend a 
perpetrator . . . .”54 Rebutting the argument that the report was 
business related, rather than an effort “to nail down the truth 
about past criminal events,” the court noted that “it was the 
business of [the police technician] to establish (if possible) who 
committed the crime.”55 Though his conclusions could have 
exculpated Rawlins, the direct involvement of this law 
enforcement officer “‘presents unique potential’ for abuse.”56 
The court ruled in Meekins, however, that the DNA reports 
at issue were nontestimonial.57 That the testers “did not 
determine whether the data [they] collected matched [defendant] 
or any other suspect” was critical to this outcome.58 The DNA 
test results, “standing alone,” without any “‘comparisons of the 
results’ to any known DNA profiles,” “shed no light on the guilt 
of the accused in the absence of an expert’s opinion that the 
results genetically match a known sample.”59 Only the Medical 
Examiner’s office determined a match with defendant, and 
defendant did not challenge the “Medical Examiner’s role.”60 
The testing procedures were “neither discretionary nor based on 
opinion,” and the testers “only contemporaneously recorded the 
                                                          
52 Id. 
53 Id. (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 828 (2006)). 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 1033 n.14. 
56 Id. (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 57 n.6 (2004)). 
57 Id. at 1034. 
58 Id. at 1035. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
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procedures employed and ‘state[d] the results of a well-
recognized scientific test.’”61 Thus, the report “is not the kind of 
ex parte testimony the Confrontation Clause was designed to 
protect against.”62 Though the technicians “knew or had every 
reason to know . . . that their findings could generate results 
that could later be used at trial,” law enforcement’s involvement 
was nevertheless “inconsequential” because it could not have 
influenced the outcome of the tests.63 Moreover, the prosecution 
called a supervising witness from the lab who, though not 
involved in the tests at issue, was available for cross-
examination regarding whether the lab’s testing protocol was 
followed.64 
Finally, “the documents . . . were not directly accusatory; 
none of them compared the DNA profile they generated to 
defendant’s.”65 In this regard, the court noted that the document 
prepared by the Division of Criminal Justice Services notifying 
the Medical Examiner’s office that there was a DNA match was 
not a business record, and, because it “comes close to a direct 
accusation that defendant committed the crime, . . . is less 
clearly nontestimonial hearsay than the other documents at 
issue.”66 But “any error” in admitting that document was 
harmless.67 
In People v. Freycinet,68 the court addressed a defendant’s 
Confrontation Clause challenge to the introduction of an autopsy 
report, in the absence of testimony from the doctor who 
performed the autopsy and prepared the report. The report was 
“redacted to eliminate [the doctor’s] opinions as to the cause and 
manner of the victim’s death.”69 Another doctor in the medical 
examiner’s office, who did not participate in the autopsy, 
                                                          
61 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Commonwealth v. Verde, 827 
N.E.2d 701, 705 (2005)). 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 1035–36. 
67 Id. at 1036. 
68 People v. Freycinet, 892 N.E.2d 843 (N.Y. 2008). 
69 Id. at 844. 
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testified to her opinions based on the facts in the absent 
pathologist’s report. The court applied the rationale of Meekins 
to unanimously reject the defendant’s claim. 
First, the court noted its prior holding in People v. 
Washington.70 In Washington, the court held that autopsy 
reports, prepared by physicians associated with the office of 
New York City’s Medical Examiner, were not discoverable 
under state law; that the Medical Examiner’s office is “not a law 
enforcement agency”; and that the duties of the office are 
“independent of and not subject to the control of the office of 
the prosecutor.”71 The report was “very largely a 
contemporaneous, objective account of observable facts.”72 
Though the doctor’s finding characterizing the victim’s injury as 
a “stab wound” was the product of an exercise of professional 
judgment, its significance to the case “derives almost entirely 
from [the absent doctor’s] precise recording of his observations 
and measurements as they occurred.”73 Thus, it was “hard to 
imagine” that the report, as redacted, “could have been 
significantly affected by a pro-law-enforcement bias.”74 The 
opinion ends by relying on the report not “directly link[ing] the 
defendant to the crime,” since it was concerned with “what 
                                                          
70 People v. Washington, 654 N.E.2d 967 (N.Y. 1995). 
71 Freycinet, 892 N.E.2d at 846. The court of appeals’ focus in Freycinet 
on whether the medical examiner’s office is an arm of the prosecution, and 
its approving reference in Rawlins to the Crager court’s focus on the DNA 
lab not being an “arm of law enforcement,” are difficult to reconcile with the 
court’s treatment of a similar Crawford-related issue in Goldstein. In 
Goldstein, the prosecution hired a private psychiatrist to rebut defendant’s 
insanity defense. The Court held that the psychiatrist’s recitation of out-of-
court statements by nontestifying declarants, which she relied on in support 
of her opinion, violated Goldstein’s Confrontation Clause rights. People v. 
Goldstein, 843 N.E.2d 727 (N.Y. 2005). In rejecting the prosecution’s 
reliance on the psychiatrist not being a “government officer,” the court 
reasoned that “[t]he Confrontation Clause would offer too little protection if 
it could be avoided by assigning the job of interviewing witnesses to an 
independent contractor rather than an employee.” Id. at 733–34; see also 
sources cited supra note 21. 
72 Freycinet, 892 N.E.2d at 846. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
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happened to the victim, not with who killed her.”75 Thus, “[the 
absent doctor] was not defendant’s ‘accuser’ in any but the most 
attenuated sense.”76 
III. THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS’ REFUSAL TO FOLLOW 
MELENDEZ-DIAZ V. MASSACHUSETTS 
The Supreme Court repudiated every essential aspect of the 
New York court of appeals’ approach to this issue in Melendez-
Diaz v. Massachusetts.77 Police searched a car in which Luis 
Melendez-Diaz was riding. They found a plastic bag containing 
nineteen smaller bags hidden in the partition between the front 
and back seats, and ultimately charged Melendez-Diaz with 
selling cocaine.78 The only proof that the bags recovered by 
police contained cocaine consisted of three sworn “certificates of 
analysis” showing the results of forensic testing performed on 
the seized substances.79 Neither the analyst nor any other expert 
was called to testify. Without detailing the nature of the testing, 
the certificates merely reported the weight of the bags and 
asserted that they contained cocaine.80 The certificates were 
sworn to by analysts at the State Laboratory Institute of the 
Massachusetts Department of Public Health,81 which is not a law 
enforcement agency.82 This practice of admitting a sworn 
“certificate of analysis” was authorized by statute, and the 
certificate constituted “prima facie evidence of the composition, 
quality, and the net weight” of the substance.83 Melendez-Diaz’s 
Confrontation Clause objection was overruled.  
On appeal, the Massachusetts appeals court rejected the 
defendant’s Confrontation Clause claim, on the authority of the 
Massachusetts supreme judicial court’s decision in 
                                                          
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009). 
78 Id. at 2530. 
79 Id. at 2531. 
80 Id. 
81 Id.  
82 Id. at 2552 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
83 Id. at 2531 (majority opinion). 
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Commonwealth v. Verde, which had held such certificates to be 
nontestimonial, and that the makers of such certificates are 
accordingly not subject to confrontation.84 The Supreme Court 
reversed, holding, by a vote of five to four, that the certificates 
were testimonial and inadmissible under the Confrontation 
Clause, since the defendant had been given no opportunity to 
cross-examine the nontestifying analysts. Justice Scalia wrote the 
Court’s opinion, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, 
and Thomas. Justice Thomas joined in the opinion but also filed 
a concurrence, adhering to his previously announced view that 
“the Confrontation Clause is implicated by extrajudicial 
statements only insofar as they are contained in formalized 
testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior 
testimony, or confessions.”85 He concluded that the sworn 
certificates at issue in Melendez-Diaz were clearly affidavits, and 
thus “‘fall within the core class of testimonial statements’ 
governed by the Confrontation Clause.”86 
Justice Scalia’s opinion begins by quoting the three potential 
formulations of “testimonial” statements set forth in Crawford.87 
He noted that these categories “mention[] affidavits twice,”88 and 
then continues,  
The documents at issue here, while denominated by 
                                                          
84 Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz, No. 05-P-1213, 2007 
WL 2189152, at *4 n.3 (Mass. App. Ct. July 31, 2007)). 
85 Id. at 2543 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
86 Id. (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992)). 
87 Id. at 2531 (majority opinion).  
Various formulations of this core class of testimonial statements 
exist: ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent—that is, 
material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony 
that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial 
statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used 
prosecutorially; extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized 
testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, 
or confessions; statements that were made under circumstances 
which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the 
statement would be available for use at a later trial. 
Id. (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51–52 (2004)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
88 Id. at 2532. 
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Massachusetts law “certificates,” are quite plainly 
affidavits: “declaration[s] of facts written down and 
sworn to by the declarant before an officer authorized to 
administer oaths.”89 They are incontrovertibly a “solemn 
declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of 
establishing or proving some fact.”90  
The majority concluded that the certificates were testimonial 
because (1) they qualified as affidavits, (2) they contained “the 
precise testimony the analysts would be expected to provide if 
called at trial,” and (3) they were “made under circumstances 
which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that 
the statement would be available for use at a later trial” (quoting 
from the broadest formulation of “testimonial” in Crawford).91  
Perhaps most significantly as one considers New York 
practice, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the major 
premise of Meekins/Freycinet: that whether a statement is 
“accusatory” in that it directly implicates the defendant in 
wrongdoing is vital to a resolution of its testimonial status. 
Instead, relying on the language of the Clause, the Court 
determined that the relevant issue is whether the statement 
relates to facts necessary for a conviction.92  
                                                          
89 Id. (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 62 (8th ed. 2004)). 
90 Id. (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51). 
91 Id. at 2531–32. 
92 Respondent first argues that the analysts are not subject to 
confrontation because they are not ‘accusatory’ witnesses, in that 
they do not directly accuse petitioner of wrongdoing; rather, their 
testimony is inculpatory only when taken together with other 
evidence linking petitioner to the contraband . . . This finds no 
support in the text of the Sixth Amendment or in our case law. 
 The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right ‘to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him.’ To the extent the 
analysts were witnesses (a question resolved above), they certainly 
provided testimony against petitioner, proving one fact necessary for 
his conviction—that the substance he possessed was cocaine. The 
contrast between the text of the Confrontation Clause and the text of 
the adjacent Compulsory Process Clause confirms this analysis. 
While the Confrontation Clause guarantees a defendant the right to 
be confronted with the witnesses ‘against him,’ the Compulsory 
Process Clause guarantees a defendant the right to call witnesses ‘in 
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Regarding “business records” and “public records,” the 
Court made it clear that when such records are prepared for 
litigation purposes, they did not qualify under the “business 
records” exception as it had originally been recognized under 
the common law.93 The opinion specifically notes that “the 
results of a coroner’s inquest”—i.e., an autopsy report—were 
not exempt from confrontation under early American common 
law.94 Of course, this suggests strongly that autopsy reports are 
testimonial and hence inadmissible without the testimony of the 
examining pathologist95—a view that had been almost uniformly 
rejected by lower courts after Crawford.  
Relatedly, Melendez-Diaz roundly rejects the notion that 
reporting the results of a forensic test is somehow less 
testimonial because such testing is “neutral” and “scientific,” in 
contrast with “testimony recounting historical events, which is 
‘prone to distortion or manipulation . . . .’”96 The Court 
explained that “[t]his argument is little more than an invitation 
to return to our overruled decision in Roberts,”97 which focused 
on a statement’s reliability rather than its testimonial character. 
The Supreme Court majority peremptorily rejected the 
dissent’s view that its opinion “sweeps away an accepted rule 
governing the admission of scientific evidence” that “has been 
established for at least 90 years,”98 pointing out that nearly all of 
those decisions either relied on, or were decided under the same 
                                                          
his favor.’ U.S. CONST., amend. VI. The text of the Amendment 
contemplates two classes of witnesses—those against the defendant 
and those in his favor. The prosecution must produce the former; the 
defendant may call the latter. Contrary to respondent’s assertion, 
there is not a third category of witnesses, helpful to the prosecution, 
but somehow immune from confrontation.  
Id. at 2533–34 (footnote omitted). 
93 Id. at 2538–40. 
94 Id. at 2538. 
95 Accord Harry Sandick & Justin Mendelsohn, Divided Supreme Court 
Extends Reach of Confrontation Clause, N.Y. L.J., July 20, 2009, at 4, col. 
1. 
96 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2536. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 2543 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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standard as, Ohio v. Roberts, which was overruled by 
Crawford.99  
It also seems clear that under Melendez-Diaz, a forensic lab 
report prepared for prosecution need not have been generated by 
a law enforcement official or agency in order to qualify as 
testimonial. Although the reports at issue were not prepared by a 
law enforcement agency,100 the Court emphasized that the report 
was prepared “under circumstances which would lead an 
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would 
be available for use at a later trial,”101 not the identity of the 
analyst’s employer. The dissenters, in contrast, would not 
require confrontation of declarants who could not qualify as 
“adversarial government officials responsible for investigating 
and prosecuting crime.”102  
In addition, the Court, in dicta, took issue with the notion 
that “‘neutral scientific testing’ is as neutral or as reliable” as 
the prosecution suggested.103 The opinion cites studies critical of 
police laboratory techniques, refers to “documented cases of 
fraud and error involving the use of forensic evidence,” and 
points out that “[c]onfrontation is designed to weed out not only 
the fraudulent analyst, but the incompetent one as well.”104 It 
notes reliability problems that have been uncovered regarding 
“common forensic tests such as latent fingerprint analysis, 
pattern/impression analysis, and toolmark and firearms 
                                                          
99 Id. at 2533 (majority opinion).  
100 See id. at 2531; id. at 2552 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice 
Kennedy noted that “[t]here is no indication that the analysts here—who work 
for the State Laboratory Institute, a division of the Massachusetts Department 
of Public Health—were adversarial to petitioner. Nor is there any evidence 
that adversarial officials played a role in formulating the analysts’ 
certificates.” Id. 
101 Id. at 2532 (majority opinion) (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 
U.S. 36, 51–52 (2004)). 
102 Id. at 2552 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Carolyn Zabrycki, 
Toward a Definition of “Testimonial”: How Autopsy Reports Do Not Embody 
the Qualities of a Testimonial Statement, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1093, 1118 
(2008)). 
103 Id. at 2536 (majority opinion) (emphasis added). 
104 Id. at 2537. 
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analysis.”105 And it further declares that there may be no viable 
alternative to cross-examination as a means of challenging 
autopsies and breathalyzer test results.106 This, of course, 
strongly suggests that such reports are testimonial. In Melendez-
Diaz, moreover, the certificates merely contained the test result 
(cocaine was found), but not what tests were performed or 
“whether interpreting their results required the exercise of 
judgment or the use of skills that the analysts may not have 
possessed.”107  
Finally, the Court declined to “relax the requirements of the 
Confrontation Clause to accommodate the ‘necessities of trial 
and the adversary process’”: 
It is not clear whence we would derive the authority to 
do so. The Confrontation Clause may make the 
prosecution of criminals more burdensome, but that is 
equally true of the right to trial by jury and the privilege 
against self-incrimination. The Confrontation Clause—
like those other constitutional provisions—is binding, and 
we may not disregard it at our convenience.108 
The Court also disputed the premise that this requirement will 
be onerous, concluding that most defendants who go to trial will 
not insist on producing the analyst, particularly in drug cases, 
and that “there is no evidence that the criminal justice system 
has ground to a halt in the States that, one way or another, 
empower a defendant to insist upon the analyst’s appearance at 
trial.”109 Melendez-Diaz rejected virtually all of the arguments 
that were relied upon by the court of appeals in Meekins and 
Freycinet to justify its viewpoint that many types of forensic lab 
reports and other scientific reports, including ones generated in 
anticipation of prosecution, are nontestimonial. Indeed, the 
                                                          
105 Id. at 2538. Though these types of police and scientific reports were 
discussed in dicta, they likely reflect the Court’s viewpoint that all of these 
documents are testimonial, as long as they contain evidence relevant to 
proving an element of a crime and are made in anticipation of prosecutorial 
use.  
106 Id. at 2536 & n.5. 
107 Id. at 2537. 
108 Id. at 2540. 
109 Id. at 2540–42. 
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Supreme Court has rejected, either directly or indirectly, all 
three of the out-of-state decisions relied on so heavily by the 
court of appeals. Commonwealth v. Verde provided the basis for 
the Massachusetts intermediate appellate court’s now-reversed 
disposition of the Melendez-Diaz case itself.110 In Barba v. 
California,111 the Supreme Court vacated an unpublished 
California intermediate appellate court decision directly applying 
People v. Geier to an identical DNA fact pattern, and remanded 
for reconsideration in light of Melendez-Diaz.112 The Supreme 
Court similarly vacated and remanded the Ohio supreme court’s 
decision in State v. Crager.113  
The centerpiece of the court of appeals’ analysis in Meekins 
and Freycinet is its premise that perhaps the most critical 
determinant of a statement’s “testimoniality” is whether it is 
“accusatory,” in that it directly implicates the defendant in 
wrongdoing. In Melendez-Diaz, the Supreme Court held such 
reasoning to be antithetical to the very language of the 
Confrontation Clause, which guarantees an accused’s right to be 
confronted with the witnesses “against” him.114 Any witness who 
                                                          
110 See Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz, No. 05-P-1213, 2007 WL 
2189152, at *4 n.3 (Mass. App. Ct. July 31, 2007), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 2527 
(2009). 
111 Barba v. California, 129 S. Ct. 2857 (2009). 
112 See People v. Barba, No. B185940, 2007 WL 4125230 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Nov. 21, 2007), cert. granted, vacated mem., 129 S. Ct. 2857 (2009). 
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Geier itself. Geier v. California, 129 
S. Ct. 2856 (June 29, 2009) (No. 07-7770). In Geier, however, the 
California supreme court decided alternatively that even if the introduction of 
the DNA report violated the Confrontation Clause, any error was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Geier, 161 P.3d 104, 140–41 (Cal. 
2007). That would have made any United States Supreme Court decision 
irrelevant to the outcome of the case, and likely explains the certiorari denial. 
113 Crager v. Ohio, 129 S. Ct. 2856 (2009). 
114 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2534; see also Paul Shechtman, Not 
Many Fireworks During a Workmanlike Term, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 31, 2009, at 
S12–S13 (“The analysis in Melendez-Diaz calls into question the thoughtful 
opinions of the Court of Appeals in Freycinet and Rawlins . . . [which] relied 
principally on the fact that the analysts whose forensic reports were received into 
evidence were not ‘accusatory’ witnesses. But in Melendez-Diaz, Justice 
Antonin Scalia rejected the notion that the Confrontation Clause distinguishes 
between accusatory and nonaccusatory witnesses.”). 
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provides facts helpful to the prosecution in proving an element 
of the crime, the Court ruled, is a witness “against” him under 
the Clause.115  
Moreover, in flatly rejecting the viewpoint that an analyst is 
somehow immunized from confrontation because she is making 
“near-contemporaneous observations,”116 the Supreme Court 
nullified another major underpinning of the analytical foundation 
of Meekins and Freycinet. In both decisions, the court of appeals 
relied on the virtually contemporaneous observations of the 
technicians, both in its discussion of the out-of-state authority it 
deemed persuasive,117 and in its analysis of the facts of the cases 
before it.118 
Nevertheless, in People v. Brown,119 the court of appeals, 
after Melendez-Diaz, reaffirmed the holding and analysis in 
Meekins, and held that a DNA report processed by a laboratory 
working as a subcontractor to the medical examiner’s office was 
not testimonial. Given the rationale of Melendez-Diaz, the 
decision of the court of appeals to confirm the analysis of 
Meekins in the Brown case is baffling, and analytically 
insupportable. Indeed, the opinion simply ignores the most 
pertinent aspects of the analysis in Melendez-Diaz, which are 
incompatible with Meekins.  
In Brown, as in Meekins, the prosecution was permitted to 
introduce a DNA report containing the results of a genetic test 
of a male specimen taken from the victim’s rape kit, performed 
by a laboratory (Bode) that acted as a subcontractor for the New 
York City Medical Examiner’s office. No analyst from Bode 
                                                          
115 See supra p. 472 and note 92. 
116 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2535. 
117 E.g., People v. Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d 1019, 1030–31 (N.Y. 2008) 
(stating that the DNA report in Crager “‘represented the contemporaneous 
recordation’ of the . . . results ‘as [they were] actually performing those 
tasks’ pursuant to industry protocols.” (alteration in original) (quoting State 
v. Crager, 116 Ohio St. 3d 369, 2007-Ohio-6840, 879 N.E.2d 745, 756)). 
118 E.g., Id. at 1035 (stating that the technicians “only contemporaneously 
recorded the procedures employed”); see also People v. Freycinet, 892 
N.E.2d 843, 846 (N.Y. 2008) (stating that the autopsy report was “very 
largely a contemporaneous, objective account of observable facts”). 
119 People v. Brown, 918 N.E.2d 927 (N.Y. 2009). 
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was called to testify. The only expert called was a forensic 
biologist/criminalist from the Medical Examiner’s office, who 
compared the genetic profile of male DNA found in the rape kit 
analyzed by Bode with a specimen of the defendant’s DNA, and 
determined there to be a match.  
The court of appeals rejected the defendant’s Confrontation 
Clause challenge to the introduction of the rape kit DNA testing 
report. Melendez-Diaz notwithstanding, the court restated the 
Meekins analytical framework as asserting the governing 
standard, and applied it to hold that the report was not 
testimonial and hence that its admission did not violate the 
Clause. In so doing, it relied upon the nonaccusatory nature of 
the report,120 its conclusion that the report was not testimonial 
because it “consisted of merely machine-generated graphs, 
charts and numerical data,”121 and its view that, since the tests 
were conducted before the defendant was a suspect and neither 
the laboratory nor the Medical Examiner’s office is a law 
enforcement entity, “any pro-law-enforcement benefit to 
manipulating the results” was thereby eliminated.122 Each of 
these rationales is flatly rejected by Melendez-Diaz. The court of 
appeals made a limited attempt to distinguish Melendez-Diaz by 
pointing out that, unlike in that case, the prosecution in Brown 
called an expert who made the determination that the defendant’s 
DNA matched the male DNA recovered from the rape kit that 
was analyzed by the lab; the court noted that she could have 
been cross-examined regarding the results of her comparison and 
about her knowledge of the lab’s procedures.123 As this Article 
will discuss,124 the Supreme Court soon specifically repudiated 
the latter distinction. 
Thus, one wonders whether the results of any of the court of 
appeals’ decisions on this subject can be reconciled with 
Melendez-Diaz. Certainly, the result in Rawlins was not 
                                                          
120 Id. at 931–32. 
121 Id. at 931. 
122 Id. at 932.  
123 Id. at 931. 
124 See infra pp. 125–26 (discussing Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. 
Ct. 2705 (2011)). 
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affected. The fingerprint comparison report was a formal police 
report that was prepared for litigation. Indeed, in Melendez-
Diaz, the Supreme Court specifically called attention to the 
value of confrontation regarding “latent fingerprint analysis.”125 
But Meekins and Brown are analytically irreconcilable with 
Melendez-Diaz.  
Although the DNA test results in Meekins did not report a 
match, the Supreme Court held in Melendez-Diaz that whether a 
document is accusatory or nonaccusatory is utterly irrelevant to 
its testimonial character. The Meekins court’s rejection of the 
significance of the declarant’s reasonable expectation of 
prosecutorial use is no longer valid; the Supreme Court relied 
heavily on that standard in Melendez-Diaz. Similarly, the court 
of appeals in Brown, as in Meekins, relied on the DNA report’s 
near-contemporaneous nature, its scientific validity, and its 
generation by a non-law-enforcement agency in holding the 
report to be nontestimonial, but Melendez-Diaz rejected each of 
these justifications for admission. Under the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning in Melendez-Diaz, such a document would be 
testimonial since it was generated at the behest of law 
enforcement, prepared in anticipation of a criminal prosecution, 
and offered to assist in proving an essential element of the 
charged crime. The post-Melendez-Diaz court of appeals’ 
decision in Brown simply ignores all of this. 
Based on Melendez-Diaz alone, one would think that 
Freycinet would have a short shelf life as well. As in Meekins, 
the Freycinet court found it critical that the report in question 
(here, an autopsy report) did not directly link the defendant to 
the crime, and hence that the pathologist “was not defendant’s 
‘accuser’ in any but the most attenuated sense.”126 As noted, 
whether a document is “accusatory” in nature is no longer 
relevant, as long as the document is offered to prove facts 
helpful to the prosecution, which the report in Freycinet was. 
Similarly, the court’s reliance on the report being “very largely 
a contemporaneous, objective account of observable facts,”127 
                                                          
125 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2538 (2009). 
126 People v. Freycinet, 892 N.E.2d 843, 846 (N.Y. 2008). 
127 Id. 
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and its having been prepared by a declarant who was employed 
by a non-law-enforcement agency, is incompatible with 
Melendez-Diaz. Moreover, as discussed above, the Melendez-
Diaz Court referred specifically to autopsy reports, in a manner 
strongly suggesting that they are to be considered testimonial. 
Under the now-applicable Supreme Court standard, the autopsy 
report in Freycinet should be considered testimonial, since it 
fulfilled an obvious testimonial purpose and was prepared with 
the reasonable expectation of prosecutorial use.  
IV. THE INADEQUACY OF THE OPPORTUNITY TO CROSS-EXAMINE 
AN EXPERT WHOSE TESTIMONY RELIES ON A NONTESTIFYING 
ANALYST’S REPORT: BULLCOMING V. NEW MEXICO 
In Melendez-Diaz, the forensic report held by the Supreme 
Court to be testimonial was admitted without accompanying 
expert testimony. In Brown, Meekins, and Freycinet, by 
contrast, the prosecution offered the reports through the 
testimony of experts who examined them and were familiar with 
the labs’ procedures, but did not call any analyst who 
participated in the testing. Thus, the question becomes whether 
this matters. Logically, the answer should be no; the cross-
examiner will remain unable to ask questions that test either the 
professional background or the techniques and procedures 
utilized by the person who performed the analysis. One 
commentator has observed that under these circumstances, “[t]he 
expert witness is not meaningfully subject to cross-examination, 
because the basis of his opinion cannot be tested according to 
the constitutionally prescribed procedure for assessing 
testimonial hearsay: cross-examination of the hearsay 
declarant.”128 
The United States Supreme Court adopted this reasoning, 
with reservations expressed in a concurring opinion by Justice 
Sotomayor, in Bullcoming v. New Mexico.129 In Bullcoming, a 
certified lab report of a test performed on the defendant’s blood 
                                                          
128 Seaman, supra note 21, at 880. 
129 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. 2713–16; id. at 2719 (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring). 
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alcohol level by an independent state agency was admitted, as a 
business record, through a supervisor from the lab who had not 
observed or performed the test. The state court held that  
[a]lthough the blood alcohol report was 
testimonial, . . . its admission did not violate the 
Confrontation Clause, because the analyst who prepared 
the report was a mere scrivener who simply transcribed 
the results generated by a gas chromatograph machine 
and, therefore, the live, in-court testimony of another 
qualified analyst was sufficient to satisfy Defendant’s 
right to confrontation.130 
A closely divided Supreme Court reversed. Justice Ginsburg 
wrote the opinion, and Justices Scalia, Thomas, Kagan, and 
Sotomayor joined for the most part. Justice Sotomayor also 
wrote a concurrence primarily in order to stress the principal 
opinion’s “limited reach.”131 The Bullcoming Court held that the 
in-court testimony of a supervisor who lacked any connection to 
the test was an entirely inadequate substitute for testimony from 
the analyst: “surrogate testimony of that order does not meet the 
constitutional requirement. The accused’s right is to be 
confronted with the analyst who made the certification, unless 
that analyst is unavailable at trial, and the accused had an 
opportunity, pretrial, to cross-examine that particular 
scientist.”132 The supervisor’s testimony “could not convey what 
[the analyst] knew or observed about the events his certification 
concerned, i.e., the particular test and testing process he 
employed. Nor could such surrogate testimony expose any 
lapses or lies on the certifying analyst’s part.”133 In short, the 
Confrontation Clause “does not tolerate dispensing with 
confrontation simply because the court believes that questioning 
one witness about another’s testimonial statements provides a 
fair enough opportunity for cross-examination.”134  
                                                          
130 State v. Bullcoming, 226 P.3d 1, 4 (N.M. 2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 
2705 (2011). 
131 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2719 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
132 Id. at 2710 (majority opinion). 
133 Id. at 2715. 
134 Id. at 2716. 
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In so holding, the Supreme Court upended the only basis upon 
which the court of appeals distinguished Brown from Melendez-Diaz: 
the presence in Brown of an opportunity to cross-examine a 
surrogate expert not involved in the testing. The Supreme Court has 
authoritatively discredited the entire analysis of Meekins and Brown. 
The Bullcoming Court determined with little difficulty that the 
lab report was testimonial under Melendez-Diaz. As in that 
decision, the report’s evidentiary purpose rendered it testimonial, 
trumping the state’s reliance on its allegedly non-“adversarial” 
nature.135 Although, unlike in Melendez-Diaz, the report was not 
sworn, it was sufficiently “formalized,” since the analyst signed a 
certificate concerning the result of the analysis.136 In addition, 
relying on Crawford, the Bullcoming Court ruled that the report’s 
“comparative reliability . . . does not overcome the Sixth 
Amendment bar.”137 
The latter pronouncement was somewhat surprising, coming 
as it did just four months after the Court’s decision in Michigan 
v. Bryant.138 In a opinion by Justice Sotomayor, the Court 
determined in Bryant that an identification of the defendant by a 
shooting victim to police on the street a short time after the 
shooting was nontestimonial. The Court based its determination 
on its view that the “primary purpose” of the interaction between 
the victim and the police officer was “to enable police assistance 
to meet an ongoing emergency,” rather than “to create a record 
for trial.”139 The Bryant Court relied, in part, on its conclusion 
that the victim’s statement was reliable, and likely fell within the 
“excited utterance” exception to the rule against hearsay.140 
Diverging sharply from Crawford, the Court opined that a 
statement’s reliability, and whether it qualified under a settled 
exception to the rule against hearsay, were significant factors 
militating against its testimonial quality.141 
                                                          
135 Id. at 2717. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 2715. 
138 Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011). 
139 Id. at 1150, 1155. 
140 Id. at 1155. 
141 Id. at 1157. 
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The opinion of the Court in Bullcoming seemingly signifies 
that the Bryant decision’s focus on reliability was not the 
precursor to a full-scale retreat from Crawford as some had 
believed, at least regarding the testimonial status of laboratory 
reports. Justice Sotomayor, the author of Bryant, stressed in her 
Bullcoming concurrence that Bryant “deemed reliability, as 
reflected in the hearsay rules, to be ‘relevant,’ not ‘essential.’”142 
However, her opinion also pointed out recurring fact patterns in 
lab report cases that she viewed as left open by Bullcoming: (1) 
cases in which there is an alternate purpose, or alternate primary 
purpose, for the report; (2) cases in which the testifying witness 
has some connection to the test at issue; (3) cases in which an 
expert is asked for her independent opinion about underlying 
testimonial reports that were not themselves admitted into 
evidence; and (4) cases in which the state introduces only 
“machine-generated results.”143 The Supreme Court should 
shortly address the third of these fact patterns in Williams v. 
Illinois.144 
The New York court of appeals has not addressed a 
Confrontation Clause lab report issue since Bullcoming. Given 
the court’s manifest failure to apply controlling Supreme Court 
precedent in the post-Melendez-Diaz case of People v. Brown, it 
is impossible to predict what it will do in such a case, though an 
essential element of Brown, the supposedly critical in-court 
presence of a surrogate expert, has now been declared irrelevant 
by the Supreme Court. It is noteworthy that in People v. 
Morrison,145 decided after Bullcoming, the Fourth Department 
held that the defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights had been 
violated by the introduction of a certified DNA report prepared 
                                                          
142 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2720 n.1 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) 
(quoting Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1155–56). 
143 Id. at 2721–23. 
144 Williams v. Illinois, No. 10-8505 (U.S. argued Dec. 6, 2011); see 
People v. Williams, 939 N.E.2d 268 (Ill. 2011), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 
3090 (2011). In Williams, an expert testified in court, despite the fact that he 
was not involved in conducting the DNA testing. The report itself was not 
admitted, but a critical part of its substance was made known to the jury. See 
Williams, 939 N.E.2d at 271–72. 
145 People v. Morrison, 935 N.Y.S.2d 234 (App. Div. 2011). 
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by an analyst who did not testify, where the prosecution did call 
another analyst who read the report and determined that the lab 
had followed proper procedure. The court cited Bullcoming, but 
did not discuss it, instead choosing to factually distinguish 
Brown.146 
CONCLUSION 
Following its important recognition of the testimonial-
hearsay character of expert “basis” testimony in Goldstein, the 
court of appeals has taken an insupportably restrictive view of 
Crawford in subsequent decisions involving the admission of 
scientific test reports in the absence of an opportunity to cross-
examine the lab analyst. Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming have 
discredited the court of appeals’ decisions in Meekins and 
Freycinet, although those cases were defensible at the time they 
were decided. The court’s refusal to reconsider Meekins in 
Brown, decided after Melendez-Diaz, is astonishing, and the 
court has already missed an opportunity to rectify that mistake 
after Bullcoming by denying permission to appeal in People v. 
Hall,147 in which the Appellate Division recently reaffirmed the 
validity of Freycinet.148 Of course, intervening developments at 
the Supreme Court, particularly the forthcoming decision in 
Williams v. Illinois, could be dispositive as well. The court of 
appeals has shown no signs of considering an independent state 
constitutional approach in this area. Unfortunately, its 
unanimous rejection of the defendant’s Confrontation Cause 
claim in Brown provides no assurance that it will follow binding 
Supreme Court Sixth Amendment authority either. 
                                                          
146 Id. The Appellate Division determined that the Confrontation Clause 
violation was harmless error. Id. at 237. 
147 People v. Hall, 923 N.Y.S.2d 428 (App. Div. 2011), leave denied, 
2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 97220(U) (Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2012) (Lippman, Ch. J.). 
148 Id. at 428. Following Bullcoming, two circuits and one state high 
court have recognized that autopsy reports are testimonial in character. 
United States v. Ignasiak, Nos. 09-10596, 09-16005, 10-11074, 2012 WL 
149314, at *9–12 (11th Cir. Jan. 19, 2012); United States v. Moore, 651 
F.3d 30, 69–74 (D.C. Cir. 2011); People v. Lewis, 806 N.W.2d 295 (Mich. 
2011). 
